SURVIVAL OF ONLY THE FITTEST SOCIAL GROUPS: THE
EVOLUTIONARY IMPACT OF SOCIAL DISTINCTION AND
PARTICULARITY

HELEN P. GRANT *

ABSTRACT
U.S. asylum law has served as a model for other nations who
are parties to the Convention on the Status of Refugees and its Protocol. The Board of Immigration Appeals approach to the protection of those who are persecuted because of their “Particular Social
Group” has been applauded for “protecting [groups] against discriminatory denial of core human rights”. It has risen to be the
preferred analytical approach of common law countries leading to
groups such as homosexuals, transsexuals, and women subject to
restrictive social and religious mores being granted protection from
persecution. However over the past 10 years the Board has seemingly stepped away from its human rights stance in support of
PSGs, leading to allegations that the United States is failing in its
Convention obligations. This article seeks to assess the impact of
the Board’s new analytical framework for determining PSGs. Other State parties to the Refugees Convention have adopted similar
criteria in assessing PSG claims without the same concerns. An
analysis of this jurisprudence provides a useful comparison to not
only measure the impact of the new approach but also provides
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guidance for those involved in PSG claims. This article does conclude that the United States’ new requirements of particularity and
social distinction while aligning in many respects with the approach of other countries, ultimately poses a danger of denial of
human rights; that this danger because of the interpretation and
application of the framework preferred by the Board poses a greater threat to human rights than in other countries. Finally with this
reality proven, the article seeks to address how asylum applicants
and their counsel may counter these foreseeable dangers.
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1. INTRODUCTION
“An attempt to confine the denotation of the term ‘a particular social group’ in order to restrict the protection accorded by the [Refugee] Convention is inappropriate where the
‘object and purpose of the Convention is the protection so
far as possible of the equal enjoyment by every person of
fundamental rights and freedoms . . . .’”1
Signatories to the United Nations Convention on the Status of
Refugees2 (Refugee Convention) and its Protocol3 spent much of
the final two decades of the Twentieth Century grappling with
whether to recognize groups such as homosexuals, transsexuals,
victims of domestic violence, and women subject to limiting social
and religious mores. The issue was whether these groups should
be protected when faced with persecutory acts within their state.
At the time the Refugee Convention was created, these groups
were not within the contemplation of the drafters—persecution
having been focused upon those who differ because of their race,
religion, nationality, or political opinion. However, in the wake of
the horrors of the Holocaust, the United Nations (UN) responded
to the conceivable threat of the yet to be foreseen atrocities against
yet to be identified groups, incorporating the “Particular Social
Group” (PSG) ground in Article 1(A)(2) of the Refugee Convention.4 It is the PSG ground that required parties to the Convention
and Protocol to eventually afford protection against persecution to
homosexuals, transsexuals, victims of domestic violence, and
women subject to restrictive social and religious mores. While the
United States (U.S.), like other countries, struggled with the extension of protection to these groups; ultimately, in light of the circumstances of the Twentieth Century world it was prepared to extend protection and grant asylum to those who were members of

1 A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, (1997) 190 CLR 225, 236
(Austl.).
2 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S.
137, in IMMIGRATION & NATIONALITY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 633 (T. Alexander
Aleinikoff et al. eds., 1967) [hereinafter Refugee Convention 1951].
3 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, June 11, 1967,
606 U.N.T.S. 267, in IMMIGRATION & NATIONALITY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 2, at 648 [hereinafter 1967 Protocol].
4 Refugee Convention 1951, supra note 2, at art. 1.
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these PSGs.5 In fact, U.S. jurisprudence in determining which
groups should or should not be protected rose to become the dominant approach of common law countries.6 The U.S. Board of Immigration Appeals’ protected characteristics test was applauded
for supporting the spirit of the Refugee Convention by affording
“protection against discriminatory denial of core human rights entitlements.”7
In the twenty-first century, it is former gang members, youth
vulnerable to recruitment by gangs, homeless and abandoned children, females subject to forced sexual relationships with gang
members, and informants on drug cartels and organized crime that
form a sample of the groups now seeking protection under the PSG
ground. The association with organized crime, gangs, and drugs
make many of them unpalatable to sections of U.S. society. Their
undesirable nature coupled with concerns over the growing numbers seeking asylum under the PSG ground may have been the catalyst for the Board of Immigration Appeals rejecting its prior humanitarian approach to protecting PSGs from persecution. The
approach of the Board has been met with outcry from asylum advocates, human rights commentators, and rejection by the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The United
States has been accused of failing to accord protection to those
whose core human rights are being denied and thus failing in its

5 See Heranandez-Montiel v. I.N.S., 225 F.3d 1084, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000) (granting asylum to a member of the PSG of “gay men with female sexual identities in
Mexico”); In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 368 (BIA 1996) (granting asylum to a
young woman who, because of her tribal membership, faced FGM); In re TobosoAlfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819, 823 (BIA 1990) (granting asylum to a gay Cuban
man).
6 MICHELLE FOSTER, THE ‘GROUND WITH THE LEAST CLARITY’: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY OF JURISPRUDENTIAL DEVELOPMENTS RELATING TO ‘MEMBERSHIP OF A
PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP’ 6 (2012), http://www.unhcr.org/4f7d8d189.html
[https://perma.cc/6RAA-XXNH]. See also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Protected
Characteristics and Social Perceptions: An Analysis of the Meaning of ‘Membership of a
Particular Social Group’ in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNHCR’S
GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 263, 275 (Erika Feller,
Volker Türk & Frances Nicholson eds., 2003) (discussing the United States’ approach to social groups).
7 Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t v. Montoya, Appeal No. CC/15806/2000,
at 13–15 (27 Apr. 2001) (IAT) (Eng.); Refugee Appeal No. 71427/99, [2000] NZAR
545, ¶ 104 (N.Z.); Islam v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t and Regina v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Another Ex Parte Shah [1999] 2 A.C. 629, 640 (HL)
(appeal taken from Eng.); Ward v. Canada, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, 739 (Can.).
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responsibilities as a party to the Refugee Convention.8 The Board
has responded by stating its current approach to the PSG ground is
not a departure from its earlier jurisprudence and, in fact, is in conformity with its prior approach to determining whether or not a
claimed group qualified for Convention protection.9
It is the aim of this article to determine whether or not the current approach of the Board of Immigration Appeals does in fact
impose additional limitations on the ability of groups to seek protection under the PSG ground, and if so, whether this is a failure on
the part of the United States to uphold its Convention obligations.
Despite the evolution of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ protected characteristics test to become the dominant approach of
common law countries, it has not been the sole methodology employed. Moreover, the Board’s new approach does bear striking
similarity to that of other party nations to the Refugee Convention.
The UNHCR has not claimed that these analytical frameworks
constitute a failure in Convention protection.
To make an informed assessment this article will first analyze
the evolution of the PSG ground including the significant role that
the United States has played in creating an internationally accepted
humanitarian approach to PSG protection. The Board’s new tripartite test will then be explicated and a comparative analysis of the
test will be undertaken with those nations who have adopted similar methodologies for assessing protection under the PSG ground.
Ultimately however, it will be shown that the Board’s new tripartite test while having commonality with these approaches is not
equivalent and indeed falls short of the protective measures advocated by these countries. Finally, the greatest weakness of the new
test, its malleability, will be explored to expose the dangers that
may ultimately lead the United States to violate its international
obligations.
2. THE CREATION AND EARLY EVOLUTION OF THE PSG GROUND
Membership of a Particular Social Group constitutes one of the
five protected grounds by which persons fleeing persecution in

Refugee Convention 1951, supra note 2.
In re W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 211 (BIA 2014) (citing Henriquez-Rivas v.
Holder, 707 F.3d 1081, 1084 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc)).
8
9

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss3/3

2017]

EVOLUTIONARY IMPACT OF SOCIAL DISTINCTION

901

their countries of origin may seek asylum.10 In theory, individuals
who have been persecuted, or face a well-founded fear of persecution, because of their race, religion, political opinion, nationality, or
particular social group are equally entitled to the protection afforded by International Law11 and the laws of the United States.12 In
assessing asylum claims, there has always been deference to those
seeking protection from persecution based on race, religion, nationality, and political opinion as opposed to those seeking protection from persecution induced by their PSG. This is even though
membership in a PSG is the second most claimed ground in the
United States.13
Part of the reason can be traced to the legal jurisprudence that
has evolved in relation to the respective grounds. Over the past
thirty years, a consistent and well-understood line of precedent has
evolved as to the groupings of “race,” “religion,” “nationality,”
and “political opinion.” Society’s familiarity with these classifications, the ability to understand what is meant by persons being of a
particular race—having a certain nationality, holding a political
opinion, or being part of and or practicing a certain religion—has
necessarily resulted in an ease of understanding and a comfort of
application within the realm of asylum law. Despite attempts by
the legal system, the same degree of clarity has not been attained
for the PSG ground.
The circumstances surrounding the inclusion of “membership
in a particular social group” in the Refugee Convention have
fueled this uncertainty.14 Its last minute inclusion at the behest of
Sweden and its unanimous adoption by the members of the United
Nations without further debate15 has led to the perception that the

10 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(42) (2014). See also Refugee Convention 1951, supra note 2,
at art. 1(A)(2) (stating the five grounds for refugee protection).
11 Id. at art. 12(2).
12 Immigration & Nationality Act of 1952 § 101, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1952); 8
C.F.R. § 101.1 (2015).
13
“After political opinion claims, the largest body of U.S. asylum and withholding jurisprudence is based upon claims of membership in a particular social
group.” 2 SHANE DIZON & NADINE WETTSTEIN, IMMIGRATION LAW SERVICE § 10:137
(2d ed. 2008).
14 Michael G. Heyman, Asylum, Social Group Membership and the Non-State Actor: The Challenge of Domestic Violence, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 767, 769 (2003);
FOSTER, supra note 6, at 2; Alienikoff, supra note 6, at 265–66.
15 Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless
Persons: Summary Rec. of the Twenty-Third Mtg., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.3.19,
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criterion was ill conceived—simply “an afterthought.”16 The explanation at the time provided by the Swedish Representative was
that “experience has shown that certain refugees had been persecuted because they belonged to particular social groups. The draft
Convention made no provision for such cases, and one designed to
cover them should accordingly be included.”17 Arguably, recognition that a forward-thinking, rather than a response-driven, approach by the United Nations was essential in the wake of the Holocaust—the need to counter as yet unforeseen forms of persecution
to yet to be identified groups.18
That the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) does not provide a definition of any of the protected grounds has compounded
the difficulties associated with establishing protection under the
PSG ground.19 When this provision was incorporated into the Refugee Act of 1980,20 Congress did not debate nor discuss the inclusion of the PSG ground.21 Rather, Congress was primarily conat 14 (Nov. 26, 1951) (including members from: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Egypt, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Greece,
Iraq, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia).
16 ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 219
(1966).
17
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless
Persons, Summary Rec. of the Third Mtg., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.3, at 14 (Nov.
19, 1951). See also Fatin v. I.N.S., 12 F.3d 1233, 1239 (3d Cir. 1993) (acknowledging
that the term social group in the context of refugees is ill-defined).
18 Arthur C. Helton, Persecution on Account of Membership in a Social Group as a
Basis for Refugee Status, 15 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 39, 41–42, 45 (1983); David L.
Neal, Women as a Social Group: Recognizing Sex-Based Persecution as Grounds for Asylum, 20 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 203, 229 (1998). See also A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 190 CLR 225, 236 (Austl.) (stating the PSG
ground “was intended to be a ‘safety net’ for any who fell within it”); GRAHLMADSEN, supra note 16, at 20.
19 In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 232 (BIA 1985). Courts have commented
upon the difficulties this has created in its interpretation and application. See Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 663 F.3d 582, 594 (3d Cir. 2011)
(“The concept is even more elusive because there is no clear evidence of legislative
intent.”); HongYing Gao v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 62, 66–67 (2d Cir. 2006) (stating that
social group is “the least well defined” ground); Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1238 (noting the
struggle in defining what a social group is); In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227,
230 (BIA 2014) (“is ambiguous and difficult to define”).
20 Pub.L. 96-212, §101(b), 94 Stat. 102, 102 (1980).
21 See Valdiviezo-Galdamez, 663 F.3d at 594 (stating that looking into the legislative intent does not provide clarifications); Koudriachova v. Gonzales, 490 F.
3d 255, 260 (2d Cir. 2007) (indicating that the value gained from the legislative his-
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cerned “to bring United States refugee law into conformance with
the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees
. . . to which the United States acceded in 1968.”22
What seemed a forward-thinking idea, a living provision
capable of evolving in a rapidly changing world, has been met with
confusion, resistance, and some would argue panic. The lack of
certainty in its meaning, the potential breadth of its application,
and its fecundity for bringing fictitious claims cultivated an atmosphere of fear that countries who were parties to the Convention
would be inundated by those claiming protection. “The ‘social
group’ category was meant to be a catch-all that could include all
the bases for and types of persecution which an imaginative despot
might conjure up.”23
Despite this, when first confronted with the issue, the Board of
Immigration Appeals24 seemed intent to pay due adherence to the
spirit of the Convention.

tory is little to zero); Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1239 (discussing lack of legislative intent).
22
I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436–37 (1987). See also Fatin, 12
F.3d at 1239 (discussing how social group was added to U.S. refugee law). While
the lack of discussion by Congress of the PSG ground is often cited, it is imprudent not to recognize that there was similarly no discussion of the other four protection grounds.
23
Nancy Kelly, Gender-Related Persecution: Assessing the Asylum Claims of
Women, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 625, 648 (1993) (citing Arthur C. Helton, Persecution
on Account of Membership in a Social Groups as a Basis for Refugee Status, 15 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 39, 41–42, 45 (1983)).
24 The Board of Immigration Appeals is part of the Executive Office of Immigration Review. “Its basic purpose is, officially, to correct errors made by the immigration judges [and certain decisions of the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services] and to resolve complex legal questions concerning the
administration of the immigration and refugee laws.” Judge Stephen Reinhardt,
Judicial Independence and Asylum Law in INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REFUGEE
LAW
JUDGES
5TH
CONFERENCE
327,
332
(2002),
http://www.iarlj.org/general/images/stories/WorldConferences/5-2002wellington.pdf [https://perma.cc/9QRC-83EQ]. The Board issues both precedential and non-precedential decisions. For a general discussion of the role of the
Board see DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 13–15 (2011).
See also Organization, Jurisdiction, and Powers of the Board of Immigration Appeal, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 (describing the Board’s functions and characteristics).
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3. U.S. EVOLUTION OF THE PSG GROUND—FROM CLARITY TO
CONFUSION

3.1. 1985–2006—Acosta and “Protected Characteristics”
In the 1985 seminal case of Acosta,25 the Board of Immigration
Appeals sought to bring clarity26 to the “Particular Social Group”
ground, through the creation of its “protected characteristics”
test.27 The doctrine was fashioned to provide homogeneity with
the other enumerated grounds of “race, religion, nationality or political opinion,” which the Board concluded “restrict refugee status
to individuals who are either unable by their own actions, or as a
matter of conscience should not be required, to avoid persecution.”28 The immutability or fundamental ideology of the characteristic being central to the assessment of whether or not a PSG falls
within the protective intentions of the INA and the Refugee Convention, the Court in Acosta noted:
[P]ersecution on account of membership in a particular social group [encompasses] persecution that is directed toward an individual who is a member of a group of persons
all of whom share a common, immutable characteristic. The
shared characteristic might be an innate one such as sex,
color, or kinship ties, or in some circumstances it might be a
shared past experience such as military leadership or land
ownership. The particular kind of group characteristic that
will qualify under this construction remains to be determined on a case-by-case basis. However, whatever the

In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (BIA 1985).
Id. at 232.
27 Id.
28
“Each of these grounds describes persecution aimed at an immutable
characteristic: a characteristic that either is beyond the power of an individual to
change or is so fundamental to individual identity or conscience that it ought not
be required to be changed. Thus, the other four grounds of persecution enumerated in the Act and the Protocol restrict refugee status to individuals who are either
unable by their own actions, or as a matter of conscience should not be required,
to avoid persecution.” Id. at 233 (internal citations omitted).
25
26
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common characteristic that defines the group, it must be
one that members of the group either cannot change or
should not be required to change because it is fundamental
to their individual identities or consciences.29
The “protected characteristics approach” supports the fundamental ideals behind the Refugee Convention of safeguarding the
core human rights of individuals when their state refuses to or fails
to provide protection.30
For the next 20 years the protected characteristics test was applied by all Federal Circuit Courts save for the Ninth Circuit,31 and
by 2000 it too was prepared to adopt the protected characteristics
test as an alternative test32 for establishing a protected PSG.33 The
application of protected characteristics permitted the recognition of
numerous PSGs not within the specific consideration of the members of the UN at the time of the adoption of the Refugee Convention or then contemplated as a source of persecution by a 1951
world—an effective application of the Swede’s living, breathing

Id.
As the Supreme Court of Canada explained when adopting the Acosta approach, it is consistent with the object and purpose of the Convention: “general
underlying themes of the defense of human rights and anti-discrimination that
form the basis for the international refugee protection initiative.” Ward v. Canada, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, 739 (Can.). See also Decision of the Refugee Appeal Board
South Africa (Applicant’s name redacted), May 13, 2002, 15–16 (S. Afr.) (on file
with author) (determining that homosexuals in Nigeria are a social group under
the Acosta definition); Refugee Appeal No. 1312/93, at 61 (N.Z.) (stating that an
Iraqi homosexual belongs to a social group); Refugee Appeal No. 71427/99, [2000]
NZAR 545, ¶ 104 (N.Z) (indicating that women make up a social group); JAMES C.
HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 161 (1991) (asserting that the protected
characteristics approach upholds “the specific situation known to the draftersconcern for the plight of persons whose social origins put them at more general
commitment to grounding refugee claims in civil or political status.”).
31
The Ninth Circuit required that for a PSG to be protected its members
must be united by a “voluntary associational relationship.” Sanchez-Trujillo v.
I.N.S., 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986).
32
Artega v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 940, 944 (9th Cir. 2007); Jie Lin v. Ashcroft,
377 F. 3d 1014, 1027 (9th Cir. 2004); Aguirre-Cervantes v. I.N.S., 242 F.3d 1169,
1175 (9th Cir. 2001); Hernandez-Montiel v. I.N.S., 225 F.3d 1084, 1087 (9th Cir.
2000).
33
After 2001, the “protected characteristics” test became the test of prevalence in the Ninth Circuit. See Artega, 511 F.3d at 944 (explaining the standard
applied by the Ninth Circuit); Lin, 377 F.3d at 1027 (discussing protected characteristics as it relates to refugee status claims based on family membership); Aguirre-Cervantes, 242 F.3d at 1175 (applying the protected characteristics in the context of the families as a particular social group).
29
30
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provision. As a result of the protected characteristics approach,
groups facing a threat of persecution based on gender,34 sexual orientation,35 tribal and clan membership,36 family membership,37 and
shared past experiences38 were afforded protection as the common
characteristic shared by the members of each of these groups is a
core human right that compels protection.
The Acosta protected characteristics test has been highly influential beyond the borders of the United States, finding favor in
other signatory states including Canada,39 the United Kingdom,40
South Africa,41 and New Zealand,42 to ultimately become “the
dominant approach among common law countries.”43 Its concordance with the human rights purpose behind the Convention,44 its

34 Yadegar-Sargis v. I.N.S., 297 F.3d 596, 604 (7th Cir. 2002) (involving Christian women in Iran who do not comply with Islamic dress requirements); In re
Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365–66 (BIA 1996) (describing women of the Tchamba-Kusuntu tribe who had not been subject to FGM and who opposed it).
35 Karouni v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1163, 1172 (9th Cir. 2005) (“homosexuals”);
Amfani v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 719, 728–30 (3d Cir. 2003) (imputing PSG to Ghanaians mistakenly believed to be homosexual); Hernandez-Montiel v. I.N.S., 225 F.3d
1084, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000) (involving gay men with female sexual identities in Mexico); In re Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819, 822 (BIA 1994).
36
Kasinga, 21 I. & N. at 366–67; In re H-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 337, 342–43 (BIA
1996).
37 Lwin v. I.N.S., 144 F.3d 505, 512 (7th Cir. 1998) (regarding parents of Burmese dissidents); Gebremichael v. I.N.S., 10 F.3d 28, 36 (1st Cir. 1993) (involving
the nuclear family).
38
Benitez-Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d 426, 431 (7th Cir. 2009) (depicting a
former Salvadoran gang member); Sepulveda v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 770, 772 (7th
Cir. 2006) (relating to former employees in the AG’s office in Colombia); Lukwago
v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 173 (3d Cir. 2003) (mentioning children from northern
Uganda who have escaped from involuntary servitude after being abducted and
enslaved); In re Fuentes, 19 I. & N. Dec 658, 662 (BIA 1988) (involving a former
member of the national police).
39 Ward v. Canada, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, 739 (Can.)
40 E.g., K v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t and Fornah v. Sec’y of State for
the Home Dep’t, [2007] 1 A.C. 412, 419 (U.K.); Islam v. Sec’y of State for the Home
Dep’t and Regina v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Another Ex Parte Shah
[1999] 2 A.C. 629, 640 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.).
41 Jian-Qiang Fang v. Refugee Appeal Board et al, Case No. 40771/05, [2006]
ZAGPHC 101 (HC) ¶ 6 (S. Afr.), http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPHC/
2006/101.pdf [https://perma.cc/8YE4-LUUW].
42 Refugee Appeal No. 1312/93, at 61 (N.Z.); Refugee Appeal No. 71427/99, [2000]
NZAR 545, ¶ 104 (N.Z).
43 FOSTER, supra note 6, at 6; Aleinikoff, supra note 6, at 275.
44
Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t v. Montoya, Appeal No.
CC/15806/2000, at 13–15 (27 Apr. 2001) (IAT) (Eng.) (recognizing that the protect-
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homogeneity with the grounds of race, religion, nationality, and
political opinion, and its ability to provide a measure that is “not
so vague as to admit persons without a serious basis for claims to
international protection”45 led to its acceptance by these nations.46
3.2. 2006–2014—The Ascendance of the Requirements of “Social
Visibility” & “Particularity”
In 2006, after some twenty-plus years of applying the protected
characteristics doctrine and facilitating its acceptance by most
common-law countries who are parties to the Refugee Convention,
the Board of Immigration Appeals changed the playing field47 in a
bid to constrain what groups may qualify for protection.48 Two
additional factors ascended to become obligatory requirements in
establishing a PSG: “social visibility” and “particularity.”49
Social visibility had made a brief appearance in the controversial 1999 decision of In re R-A-,50 a claim of a Guatemalan woman who had suffered horrific domestic abuse. In rejecting the
claimed PSG of “Guatemalan women who have been intimately
involved with Guatemalan male companions, who believe that
women are to live under male domination,” the Board opined that
while the claimed PSG met the protected characteristics test, the
group was artificially conceived for the purposes of the case51 and
ed characteristics approach accords “the underlying need for the Convention to
afford protection against discriminatory denial of core human rights entitlements.”).
45 HATHAWAY, supra note 30, at 161.
46 As will be discussed below in Section 4, these countries refused to follow
the “social perception” approach upon the basis that it was too wide and all encompassing.
47 In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 956–57 (BIA 2006).
48 FOSTER, supra note 6, at 29–30.
49
An asylum petitioner must now prove: (1) that the claimed PSG group
members meet the protected characteristics doctrine; (2) that the group was sufficiently “particular”; and (3) was “perceived by the community in which they lived
as a social group. C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 956–57 (explaining how “protected
characteristics” and “particularity” were referred to by the Board as requirements;
whereas social visibility was referred to as a “relevant factor”).
50 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (BIA 1999). In re R-A- was later vacated by the Attorney General in anticipation of new rules. In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (BIA
2001).
51 While the group may have been artificially conceived, this was a product
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bore no relation to whether Guatemalans perceived the group to
exist.52 The Board asserted for the first time that Acosta was “the
starting point for assessing social group claims”53 and had never claimed
it to be “the ending point,”54 though in so stating they were not asserting
that the factors taken into account in In re R-A- were requirements for all
cases.55
Social visibility did not surface again until 2006, when the
Board saw it as appropriate to apply this factor in rejecting “former
noncriminal drug informants working against the Cali drug cartel”
as a PSG.56 In re C-A- provides insight into the Board’s claimed basis for the social visibility requirement. Interestingly, the Board
professed not to be the author of social visibility criterion but rather asserted that the birth of the concept could be traced to a 1991
decision of the Second Circuit57 and Guidelines issued by the
UNHCR.58 The claimed support for social visibility is questionable. The Board’s application of the Second Circuit’s decision in the
case of In Re C-A-59 is at best selective and at its worst is outright
contortion, and the UNHCR strenuously denies that it endorses the

of the Board’s approach to date in dealing with the issue of gender claimed groupings and its bid to limit those who are able to claim asylum on the basis of genderbased persecution for fear of floodgates. This approach commenced with the
Board’s articulation of PSGs in In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 368 (BIA 1996)
(describing women of the Tchamba-Kusuntu tribe who had not been subject to
female genital cutting and who opposed it). The success of this claim led asylum
advocates to articulate PSG claims in a similarly circumscribed and artificial manner.
52
“For the group to be viable for asylum purposes, we believe there must
also be some showing of how the characteristic is understood in the alien's society,
such that we, in turn, may understand that the potential persecutors in fact see
persons sharing the characteristic as warranting suppression or the infliction of
harm.” R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 918.
53 Id. at 920.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 958 (BIA 2006).
57 Id. at 956 (citing Gomez v. I.N.S., 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991)).
58 C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 956, 960 (citing U.N. High Comm’r Human Rights,
Guidelines on International Protection: “Membership of a particular social group”
within the context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/02/02 (May 7, 2002),
http://www.unhcr.org/3d58de2da.pdf [https://perma.cc/5W54-TXFD] [hereinafter UNHCR Guidelines]).
59 See generally In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951 (BIA 2006).
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Board’s approach to determining a qualifying PSG.60
The Board, in relying on Gomez,61 asserted the Second Circuit’s
precedent “that the members of a social group must be externally
distinguishable”62 to constitute a social group, requires that the
group be “socially visible.”63 While the explanation of the test as
“socially visible” may appear to be synonymous with the Second
Circuit’s test of “externally distinguishable,”64 the Second Circuit
had adopted a test of social perception, not social visibility, finding
that the claimed PSG had to be recognizable by either the applicant’s general society or by the persecutor.65
In comparison, the Board’s application of social visibility in In
re C-A-66 and in a number of subsequent decisions was literal; that
a person who was from the claimed PSG should be visually recognizable to others as belonging to that group for the PSG to exist,67
what the Board ultimately labeled “ocular visibility.”68 In re C-A-69
60
Brief of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as Amicus
Curiae in Support of the Petitioner at 22, Bueso-Avila v. Holder, 663 F.3d 934 (7th
Cir. 2010) (No. 09-2878); Brief of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 14, Gaitan v. Holder, 671 F.3d
678 (8th Cir. 2010) (No. 10-1724); UNHCR Valdiviezo-Galdamez, infra note 76, at 17.
61 Gomez v. I.N.S., 947 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1991).
62 C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 956.
63 Id. at 960–61.
64 See Gomez, 947 F.2d at 663 (describing the Second Circuit’s refusal to recognize the PSG of “women who have been previously battered and raped by Salvadorian guerillas” under the following reasoning: “A particular social group is
comprised of individuals who possess some fundamental characteristic in common which serves to distinguish them in the eyes of a persecutor-or in the eyes of
the outside world in general . . . . A ‘particular social group’ normally comprises
persons of similar background, habits or social status. . . . Like the traits which distinguish the other four enumerated categories-race, religion, nationality, and political opinion-the attributes of a particular social group must be recognizable and
discrete. Possession of broadly-based characteristics such as youth and gender
will not by itself endow individuals with membership in a particular group.”)
65 Id. at 664.
66 23 I. & N. Dec. 951 (BIA 2006).
67 See In re E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 591, 594 (BIA 2008) (describing that “‘persons resistant to gang membership’ lacks the social visibility that would allow
others to identify its members as part of such a group . . . . The respondent does
not allege that he possesses any characteristics that would cause others in Honduran society to recognize him as one who has refused gang recruitment.”); In re AT-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 296, 302 (BIA, 2007) (“we are doubtful that young Bambara
women who oppose arranged marriage have the kind of social visibility that
would make them readily identifiable to those who would be inclined to persecute them”), vacated and remanded, 24 I. & N. Dec. 617 (BIA 2008).
68 In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 246 (BIA 2014); In re W-G-R-, 26 I. & N.
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itself is a perfect example of the Board’s own application of “ocular
visibility”:
[T]he very nature of the conduct at issue is such that [the
claimed PSG of confidential informants] are generally out
of the public view. In the normal course of events, an informant against the Cali cartel intends to remain unknown
and undiscovered. Recognizability or visibility is limited to
those informants who are discovered because they appear
as witnesses or otherwise come to the attention of cartel
members.70
The unmistakable implication being that any group that remains underground cannot be literally seen by society and thereby
cannot be a PSG deserving of protection. Such an interpretation
failed to pay due consideration to whether C-A-was perceived by
either his persecutor or in the eyes of the outside world as different, as the Second Circuit had clearly articulated. 71 The Board instead fixated upon whether C-A- would be known on sight as a
criminal informant by members of the public.72
The adoption of social visibility signaled abandonment by the
Board of an approach that interpreted the PSG ground homogenously with the grounds of race, religion, nationality and political
opinion. Literal visibility necessitates that a person’s fundamental
human rights are only worthy of protection once there is actual
knowledge that he or she is different, and for this to occur, the applicant must literally become visible to their persecutors. As a consequence, the applicant is required to place themselves in the face
of the very jeopardy that they are fleeing and asking nations such
as the United States to protect them against. That the individual be
persecuted before they can claim protection has never been the
threshold to protection under the Refugee Convention, only that
the applicant has a “well-founded fear” of persecution. Such an
approach is inconsistent with a long line of authority in U.S. immi-

Dec. 208, 216 (BIA 2014).
69 23 I. & N. Dec. 951 (BIA 2006).
70 Id. at 960.
71 Gomez v. I.N.S., 947 F.2d 660, 663 (2d Cir. 1991) (“distinguish them in the
eyes of a persecutor-or in the eyes of the outside world in general.”)
72
C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 960 (“Recognizability or visibility is limited to
those informants who are discovered because they appear as witnesses or otherwise come to the attention of cartel members.”)
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gration law, that simply because an individual can avoid persecution by, for example, remaining ‘in the closet’ as a homosexual, or
practicing their religion underground, or disguising their heritage
does not mean the person should not be protected.73 Such an approach is inconsistent with the United States’ obligations under the
Refugee Convention.74
The Board, as previously mentioned, claimed support for the
criterion of social visibility as an “And” requirement from the
United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees.75 The UNHCR
does indeed endorse an approach of “social perception;” however,
there are two very important factors that the Board did not disclose
when citing to the UNHCR Social Group Guidelines: First, the
UNHCR advocated and still advocates that the “social perception”
approach is an alternate means by which a PSG may be established
rather than as an added criterion.76 In countries that have adopted
the protected characteristics approach according to the UNHCR,
application of the social perception approach should only occur after the claimed PSG has not been established pursuant to the protected characteristics approach,77 to ensure that those for whom

73 Raskane v. Holder, 562 F.3d 1283, 1288 (10th Cir. 2010); Karouni v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1163, 1172–73 (9th Cir. 2005); Pozos v. Gonzales, 141 Fed. Appx. 629,
632 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2005); Antipova v. Attorney Gen., 392 F.3d 1259, 1263–65 (11th
Cir. 2004); Muhur v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 958, 960–61 (7th Cir. 2004); Zhang v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 713, 719–20 (9th Cir. 2004).
74 U.N. High Comm’r Human Rights, Guidelines on International Protection
No. 9: Claims to Refugee Status based on Sexual Orientation and/or Gender Identity within the context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/12/09 (Oct. 23, 2012)
¶ 31 (“That an applicant may be able to avoid persecution by concealing or by being ‘discreet’ about his or her sexual orientation or gender identity, or has done so
previously, is not a valid reason to deny refugee status. As affirmed by numerous
decisions in multiple jurisdictions, a person cannot be denied refugee status based
on a requirement that they change or conceal their identity, opinions or characteristics in order to avoid persecution.”)
75 C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 956.
76
UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 58, at 3–4; The United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees’ Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of Respondent at 12,
In re Valdiviezo-Galdamez, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227 (BIA 2012) (No. A097447286),
http://www.refworld.org/docid/503653562.html
[https://perma.cc/WLV2L3LU] [hereinafter UNHCR Valdiviezo-Galdamez]; Brief Amicus Curiae of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Support of Respondent Francis
Gatimi at 7–12, In re Gatimi, (BIA 2010) (No. A 69495092), http://
www.refworld.org/docid/4bb0698e2.html
[https://perma.cc/B6R5-CKZV]
[hereinafter UNHCR Gatimi].
77 See UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 58, at 3–4.
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there is an international obligation to protect are protected. Second, social perception is just that, “perception” of a society and
does not require that the group be “ocularly visible.”78 Not only
does reference to the UNHCR’s Social Group Guidelines79 make
this clear, but the UNHCR has in numerous amicus curiae briefs80
emphatically rejected their support for the Board’s social visibility
test.81
In a decision following closely upon the heels of In re C-A-,82
the Board elevated social visibility from a factor to be considered in
determining the existence of a PSG to a requirement.83 While the
Board at one point in the judgment referred to social visibility as a
factor, it shortly thereafter referred to it as a “requirement.”84 The
result was that subsequent Circuit Court decisions referring to In re
A-M-E-85 disclaimed the existence of PSGs on the basis that while
meeting the Acosta protected characteristics approach, the group’s
lack of social visibility was fatal.86 Despite the earlier assertion of

78
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ Amicus Curiae
Brief in Support of Petitioner at 6–7, Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1082
(2013)
(No.
09-71571
(A098-660-718)), http://www.refworld.org/docid/
4f4c97c52.html [https://perma.cc/3KAG-T288] [UNHCR Henriquez-Rivas].
79
“[A] particular social group is a group of persons who share a common
characteristic other than their risk of being persecuted, or who are perceived as a
group by society. The characteristic will often be one which is innate, unchangeable, or which is otherwise fundamental to identity, conscience or the exercise of
one’s human rights.” UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 58, at 3–4.
80
See UNHCR Gatimi, supra note 76, at 7–10, 9-12; UNHCR ValdiviezoGaldamez, supra note 76, at 11.
81
See, e.g., UNHCR Henriquez-Rivas, supra note 78, at 6–7 (stressing that the
protected characteristics and social perception approaches are two separate tests
and that “[r]equiring applicants to meet both approaches is fundamentally inconsistent with the Social Group Guidelines”).
82 23 I. & N. Dec. 951 (BIA 2006).
83 See In re A-M-E-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 73–75 (BIA 2007), aff’d, Ucelo-Gomez v.
Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 2007) (“whether a proposed group has a shared
characteristic with the requisite “social visibility” must be considered in the context of the country of concern and the persecution feared”).
84 Id. at 74.
85 Id. at 73–75.
86 See e.g., Scatambuli v. Holder, 558 F.3d 53, 60 (1st Cir. 2009) (“[T]hose who
knew of the petitioners’ identity as informants was quite small; the petitioners
were not particularly visible.”); Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 738, 746 (9th
Cir. 2008) (“The harassment appears to have been part of general criminality and
civil unrest; Santos-Lemus’s ‘group’ was not particularly socially visible to the
gang . . . .”); In re A-T-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 296, 303 (BIA, 2007) (“[W]e are doubtful
that young Bambara women who oppose arranged marriage have the kind of so-
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the Board in In re R-A- that the additional criterion of social perception and visibility within a society “are not prerequisites”87 to establishing the existence of a PSG, it was now to become the case.
Particularity was clearly labeled as a requirement in the case of
In re C-A-.88 Despite so doing, there was a lack of explanation of
how the particularity requirement should be established by applicants and evaluated by adjudicators. The Board’s dicta that the
claimed social group of “noncriminal informants” “. . . is too loosely defined to meet the requirement of particularity”89 and that it
could “potentially include persons who passed along information
concerning any of the numerous guerrilla factions or narcotrafficking cartels currently active in Colombia to the Government
or to a competing faction or cartel”90 provided little guidance. Subsequent jurisprudence equated particularity with the ability of the
claimed group to be “accurately . . . described in a manner sufficiently distinct that the group would be recognized, in the society
in question, as a discrete class of persons.”91 How this is different
from the requirement of social visibility was unclear.92 As the case
law developed, a correlation between discreteness and the size of
the claimed social group became apparent.93 The greater the size of
the group, the less likely it could be considered sufficiently particular. The imposition of a size requirement upon the PSG invoked
much criticism.94 It belied consistency with the other protected

cial visibility that would make them readily identifiable to those who would be
inclined to persecute them.”).
87 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 919 (BIA 2001).
88 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 957 (BIA 2006).
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 In re S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 584 (BIA 2008).
92
Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 663 F.3d 582, 605 (3d
Cir. 2011).
93 Portillo v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 435 Fed. App'x 844, 847 (11th Cir. 2011) (rejecting a proposed social group for being overly broad because it “would serve as
a catch-all for every former military member who did not fall within one of the
five protected groups, creating numerosity concerns”); S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at
584 (in which the Board noted that “the size of the proposed group may be an important factor in determining whether the group can be . . . recognized . . . .”); In re
A-M-E, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 76 (BIA 2007) (“Because the concept of wealth is so indeterminate, the proposed group could vary from as little as 1 percent to as much
as 20 percent of the population, or more.”). See also Malonga v. Mulasey, 546 F. 3d
546, 553 (8th Cir. 2008) (emphasizing the importance of a group’s social visibility).
94
See ANKER, supra note 24, at 348; FOSTER, supra note 6, at 31–32 (“it is not
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grounds; no size limitation has been imposed upon the grounds of
race, religion, nationality, or political opinion.95 As such, the United States’ particularity requirement has been perceived as antithetical to the spirit of the Refugee Convention and a repudiation by
the United States of its international obligations under the treaty.96
The Board of Immigration Appeal’s new requirements ultimately led to a circuit split. The Third and Seventh Circuit’s rejected the social visibility and particularity requirements, returning to
the Acosta protected characteristics approach.97 They determined

clear how an applicant could successfully establish this essential element”); Brief
of Amicus Curiae The National Immigrant Justice Center in Support of Petitioner
at 10–13, Santos v. Holder (3d Cir. 2014) (No. 14-1050), http://
www.immigrantjustice.org/sites/default/files/Santos%20Amicus%20Brief.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EM7R-3EDQ] (discussing the restrictions of the added requirements); Brief for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 4, Rivera-Barrientos v. Holder, 666 F.3d
641 (10th Cir. 2012) (No. 10-9527), http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/
texis/vtx/rwmain?page=search&docid=4c6cdb512&skip=0&query=petitioner%
20rivera-barrientos [https://perma.cc/38FJ-P7J4] (“the Board’s imposition of the
requirements of “social visibility” and “particularly” may result in refugees being
erroneously denied international protection”) [hereinafter UNHCR RiveraBarrientos].
95 See U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, GUIDANCE NOTE ON REFUGEE CLAIMS
RELATING TO VICTIMS OF ORGANIZED GANGS, ¶ 35 (2010), http://
www.refworld.org/pdfid/4bb21fa02.pdf [https://perma.cc/2GFH-ERSW] (“As
with other types of claims, the size of the group is also not relevant.”); UNHCR
Guidelines, supra note 58, at 5 (“The size of the purported social group is not a relevant criterion in determining whether a particular social group exists within the
meaning of Article 1A(2)”).
96
UNHCR Rivera-Barrientos, supra note 94, at 4 (offering examples of the
standard’s restrictions). See e.g., UNHCR Henriquez-Rivas, supra note 78, at 5 (“the
‘particularity’ requirement seems to be a reiteration of the ‘social visibility’ test
and in any event is likewise inconsistent with the Social Group Guidelines, the 1951
Convention and the 1967 Protocol”).
97
See Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 663 F.3d 582, 594
(3d Cir. 2011) (“The BIA's requirements of “social visibility” and “particularity”
are not entitled to Chevron deference.”); Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d 426, 430–31
(7th Cir. 2009) (“We join our sister circuits that have held that there is no on-sight
visibility requirement for a particular social group to be cognizable under the
INA”); Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615–16 (7th Cir. 2009) (“We just don't see
what work ‘social visibility’ does”). See also Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 672 (7th
Cir. 2013) (“[Y]oung Albanian women who live alone” constitute a cognizable social group as the members of the group are “united by the common and immutable characteristic of being (1) young, (2) Albanian, (3) women, (4) living alone.”);
Escobar v. Holder, 657 F.3d 537, 545–47 (7th Cir. 2011) (finding that “former truckers who resisted FARC and collaborated with authorities” could be considered a
particular social group based upon their immutable past experience—it was also
considered important that the resistance of the group was based upon their politi-
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social visibility, as a concept, to be illogical,98 unclear,99 and inconsistent with past precedent.100 Other circuits joined the Third and
Seventh Circuits as far as rejecting an interpretation of social visibility that required the applicant’s group status be visible to the
“naked eye.”101 Particularity in the view of the Third Circuit was
simply a reiteration of social visibility,102 and the Ninth Circuit,
while not explicitly rejecting the notion of particularity, stressed
that broad groupings could still constitute a particular social group
and that size was irrelevant to the existence of a PSG.103

cal support of the government, something that they should not be required to
change).
98 Gatimi, 578 F.2d at 615 (stating that it “makes no sense”). See also Sarhan
v. Holder, 658 F.3d 649, 655 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Gatimi when describing that the
concept “makes no sense”).
99
See Gatimi, 578 F.2d at 615 (noting the inconsistency of the Board’s opinions on the topic); Benitez-Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d 426, 430 (7th Cir. 2009)
(showing how it is often unclear whether the Board is using the term ‘‘social visibility’’ in the literal sense or in the ‘‘external criterion’’ sense, or even-whether it
understands the difference).
100
For example, the Seventh Circuit pointed to the fact that women who
were yet to be subjected to FGM did not look different to other women in the
tribe, obviously directing this comment to application of social visibility as requiring ocular observance of the social group trait. Gatimi, 578 F.2d at 615. See also
Valdiviezo-Galdamez, 663 F.3d at 604 (“it is unclear whether this means that the
group's shared characteristic must be visible to the naked eye”); Sarhan, 658 F.3d
at 644 (in which the Seventh Circuit found it irrelevant that women faced with
honor killings do not look different from other women in their society).
101
This includes the Fourth, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits. Temu v.
Holder, 740 F.3d 887, 892–93 (4th Cir. 2014); Umana-Ramos v. Holder, 724 F.3d
667, 669 (6th Cir. 2013); Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1082, 1087–88 (9th
Cir. 2013); Rivera-Barrientos v. Holder, 666 F.3d 641, 652 (10th Cir. 2012).
102 Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 663 F.3d 582, 608 (3d Cir.
2011) (“In the government's view, ‘particularity’ serves a different function from
‘social visibility’ in determining whether the asylum applicant has described a
cognizable social group.”).
103 The Seventh Circuit pointed out that: “Many of the groups recognized by
the Board and courts are indeed quite broad. These include: women in tribes that
practice female genital mutilation; Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 365, Agbor,
487 F.3d at 502 (7th Cir. 2007); persons who are opposed to involuntary sterilization, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B); Chen v. Holder, 604 F.3d 324, 332 (7th Cir. 2010);
members of the Darood clan and Marehan subclan in Somalia, In re H-, 21 I. & N.
Dec. at 340, 343 (1% of the population of Somalia are members of the Marehan
subclan); homosexuals in Cuba, In re Toboso–Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819, 822–23
(BIA 1990); Filipinos of Chinese ancestry living in the Philippines, Matter of V–T–
S–, 21 I. & N. Dec. 792, 798 (BIA 1997) (approximately 1.5% of the Philippines
population has an identifiable Chinese background). . . . The ethnic Tutsis of
Rwanda numbered close to 700,000 before the genocide of 1994, and yet a Tutsi
singled out for murder who managed to escape to the United States could surely
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While the remainder of the Circuits gave due deference to the
Board’s new requirements, their interpretation and application of
the requirements differed. Dependent upon the circuit, for a PSG
to be socially visible requires an applicant to establish the existence
of a common characteristic setting them apart from others in the
society;104 that the alleged PSG must be a perceived as a cohesive
group by society;105 that the individual is readily identifiable by the
characteristic;106 or that the group must be perceived by society as
being at greater risk of persecution.107 In addition, there was inconsistency as to whom the group must be visible to: the applicant’s society,108 the applicant’s country,109 the persecutor,110 or visibility to both the country and the applicant’s community.111
qualify for asylum in this country. And undoubtedly any of the six million Jews
ultimately killed in concentration camps in Nazi-controlled Europe could have
made valid claims for asylum . . . .” Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 674–75 (7th Cir.
2012) (internal citations included).
104
Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70, 73 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[T]his Court’s
reasoning [is] that a ‘particular social group is comprised of individuals who possess some fundamental characteristic in common which serves to distinguish
them in the eyes of a persecutor—or in the eyes of the outside world in general.’”).
See also Barrientos v. Holder, 658 F.3d 1222, 1232 (10th Cir. 2011) (describing that
social visibility requires citizens sharing a trait to “constitute a distinct social
group”).
105 See Constanza v. Holder, 647 F.3d 749, 753 (8th Cir. 2011) (“a social group
requires sufficient particularity and visibility such that the group is perceived as a
cohesive group by society”).
106
See Lizama v. Holder, 629 F.3d 440, 447 (4th Cir. 2011) (“discussing concrete traits that would readily identify a person as possessing those characteristics”).
107 See Davila-Mejia v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 624, 629 (8th Cir. 2008) (discussing
individuals that “were recognized as a group that is at a greater risk of crime in
general or of extortion, robbery, or threats in particular”).
108
The First Circuit requires that the claimed PSG be visible to the applicant’s society and rejects that social visibility can be established by claiming the
PSG is visible to the applicant’s persecutor. Mendez-Barrera v. Holder, 602 F.3d
21, 27 (1st Cir. 2010); Amilcar-Orellana v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 86, 91 (1st Cir. 2008).
See also Umana-Ramos v. Holder, 724 F.3d 667, 671 (6th Cir. 2013) (describing that
social visibility “requires ‘that the shared characteristic of the group should generally be recognizable by others in the community’”); Constanza, 647 F.3d at 753
(“the group is perceived as a cohesive group by society”).
109 See Barrientos, 658 F.3d at 1232 (determining whether “citizens of the applicant's country would consider individuals with the pertinent trait to constitute
a distinct social group”).
110
The Second and Fifth Circuits permitted either social visibility of the
group to society or to the persecutor. Orellana-Monson v. Holder, 685 F.3d 511,
522 (5th Cir. 2012); Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70, 73 (2d Cir. 2007).
111
Barrientos v. Holder, 658 F.3d 1222, 1232 (10th Cir. 2011) (requiring that
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Similarly the circuits diverged upon the parameters of the particularity requirement upon such issues as whether the size of the
group was too large;112 the broadness of the proposed PSG;113
whether the society identified the applicant as belonging to the asserted PSG;114 or a combination of these factors.115
3.3. 2014–Present––Solidification of “Social Distinction” and
“Particularity”
In the wake of the controversy and calls for clarity by a number
of the Federal Circuits,116 on February 7, 2014 the BIA elucidated its
legal position on when a PSG will qualify as deserving of protection for asylum in two cases: In re W-G-R-117 and In re M-E-V-G-.118
The result was the firm endorsement of a tripartite test for establishing a “particular social group”; that an applicant is required to
prove that their claimed PSG shares an immutable characteristic,
that the group is socially distinct, and that the group is sufficiently
particular.119 The Board firmly endorsed the obligatory nature of
all three elements, while elaborating upon and arguably refining
the requirements in a bid to provide greater clarity.
“the applicant’s country would consider individuals with the pertinent trait to
constitute a distinct social group” and “the applicant’s community is capable of
identifying an individual as belonging to a group”).
112 See id. at 1230 (“the described group is ‘a potentially large and diffuse segment of society’”).
113 Gaitan v. Holder, 671 F.3d 678, 682 (8th Cir. 2012) (“we agree with the BIA
that Gaitan's articulated social group is not sufficiently narrowed to cover a discrete class of persons”); Zelaya v. Holder, 668 F.3d 159, 166 (4th Cir. 2012) (“I
reach this conclusion not because the members of the proposed group lack kinship ties, but rather because the characteristics of the group are, in my view,
broader and more amorphous . . . .”).
114
Mendez-Barrera v. Holder, 602 F.3då 21, 27 (1st Cir. 2010) (holding that
the group was not socially visible).
115
See Gashi v. Holder, 702 F.3d 130, 137 (2d Cir. 2012) (requiring that the
group be finite and its membership be verifiable).
116 See Rojas-Perez v. Holder, 699 F.3d 74, 81 (1st Cir. 2012) (noting that it is
particularly unclear how courts are to square the BIA's more recent statements regarding the social visibility requirement with its former decisions).
117 26 I. & N. Dec. 208 (BIA 2014).
118 26 I. & N. Dec. 227 (BIA 2014).
119
See id. at 237 (“Membership in a particular social group must establish
that the group is (1) composed of members who share a common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the society
in question.”).
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The first element, the time honored “Protected Characteristics”
Doctrine, continues to require that an applicant establish that the
members of the PSG:
share a common, immutable characteristic. The shared
characteristic might be an innate one such as sex, color, or
kinship ties, or in some circumstances it might be a shared
past experience such as former military leadership or land
ownership . . . However, whatever the common characteristic that defines the group, it must be one that the members
of the group either cannot change, or should not be required to change because it is fundamental to their individual identities or consciences.120
The Board’s decisions since 2005 have not altered the interpretation of this doctrine; the one difference is that it is only the first
step in a three-part assessment.
The second requirement, “Social Distinction,” according to the
Board is simply a retitling and not a reformulation of the social visibility requirement;121 the retitling of “social visibility” to “social
distinction” would bring greater clarity to the meaning and application of the requirement.122 The Board unequivocally stated that it
never intended social distinction to require that members of the
claimed PSG be “socially visible” in the sense of recognizable on
sight;123 “social visibility does not mean ‘ocular’ visibility-either of
the group as a whole or of individuals within the group-any more
than a person holding a protected religious or political belief must
be ‘ocularly’ visible to others in society.”124 Rather the requirement
demands “society in general perceives, considers, or recognizes
persons sharing the particular characteristic to be a group.”125

120 W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 212 (citing to In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211,
233 (BIA 1985)).
121 See M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 240 (referencing “social distinction”); WG-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 216 (referencing “social distinction”).
122
See M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 240 (“The renamed requirement ‘social
distinction’ clarifies that social visibility does not mean ‘ocular’ visibility--either of
the group as a whole or of individuals within the group--any more than a person
holding a protected religious or political belief must be ‘ocularly’ visible to others
in society.”).
123 Id. at 235–36. See also W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 211 (discussing social visibility).
124 M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 236, 240.
125 W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 217.
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Importantly, the relevant society to perceive, consider, or recognize the grouping is that of the “citizens of the applicant’s country”126 or “the applicant’s community.”127 Whether it is the “citizens of the applicant’s country” or the “applicant’s community”
which is the relevant society will depend upon a case-by-case analysis.128 As the Board indicates, persecution in a remote region of a
country or in a small subset of the country’s society may require
that that the relevant society is that of the individual’s immediate
community rather than citizens of the applicant’s country.129 This,
at least in theory, neutralizes the suggestion that the asylum applicant must, in all cases, be able to establish that the claimed PSG exists as distinct in both their immediate community and to citizens
at large.
In assessing whether or not the claimed PSG is socially distinct,
the perception of the persecutor alone cannot be determinative.130
While the persecutor’s perceptions may be useful as evidence to
assist in establishing the society in question recognizes the claimed
PSG,131 “the persecutors’ perception is not itself enough to make a
group socially distinct.”132 The reason is that the PSG must exist
separately as a group that society views as distinct, as “persecutory
conduct alone cannot define the group.”133 Importantly, the Board
recognizes that persecution can ultimately lead to the creation of a
group which is distinct in the eyes of the relevant society.134 It may
be “the catalyst that causes the society to distinguish the [group] in
a meaningful way and consider them a distinct group . . . .” 135
Some confusion does arise, as the Board’s explanation includes reference to the members of the PSG who also consider themselves to

Id.
Id.
128 Id. at 212 (citing I.N.S. v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999)).
129 See M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 243 (discussing narrowing the analysis to
a social group within a tribe).
130 See id. at 242 (indicating that “the persecutors’ perception is not itself
enough to make a group socially distinct, and persecutory conduct alone cannot
define the group”).
131 Id.
132 Id. (citing In re A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 74 (BIA 2007)).
133 M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 242.
134 Id. at 231.
135 Id. at 243.
126
127
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be a separate group.136 Only time will tell whether this will metamorphose into an additional sub-rule of the social distinction element or whether it was simply an example that was not to be taken
literally.
Particularity, the final element, is aimed at determining who
does and who does not fall within the group. For the claimed social group to be sufficiently particular, the Board requires it to be
narrowly defined: “it must not be amorphous, overbroad, diffuse,
or subjective.”137 This would mean that the circle is large and diffuse, rather than a socially distinct group which has a tight-fitting
circumference. To clarify the object behind particularity, the BIA
endorsed the Ninth Circuit’s approach that “major segments of the
population will rarely, if ever, constitute a distinct social group.”138
The PSG must be discrete, and to be discrete it must have well defined boundaries.
The notion behind particularity is to draw a close-fitting circle
around the group in the sense of providing “a clear benchmark for
determining who falls within the group”139 and who does not.140
Therefore, amorphous groups based upon general, wide, allencompassing features, such as poverty, youth, and homelessness
will not meet the delineation required by the Board’s particularity
element.141 The limits of the group can be tested by crossreferencing the suggested PSG with the element of social distinction and asking whether, given the cultural and social context of
the applicant’s country (and one would assume if necessary community), the society in question regards the group as discrete, rather than as generally characteristic of any society that exists.142 In

Id. at 242–43.
In re W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 214 (BIA 2004) (citing Ochoa v. Gonzalez, 406 F.3d 1166, 1170–71 (9th Cir. 2005)).
138 Ochoa v. Gonzalez, 406 F.3d 1166, 1170–71 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing SanchezTrujillo v. I.N.S., 801 F.2d 1571, 1577) (9th Cir. 1986)).
139
W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 214 (citing In re A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N.
Dec. 69, 74 (BIA 2007)).
140 See W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 213 (citing with approval Escobar v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 363, 367–68 (3d Cir. 2005) and stating that there is a need to set perimeters for a protected group).
141 See W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 213 (citing with approval Escobar, 417 F.3d
at 367–68).
142 See W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 213 (stating that “the definition of a particular social group is not addressed in isolation but in context of the society out of
which the claim for asylum arises”).
136
137
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most cases, it is implicit that the smaller the group the more likely
it is to be acceptable. This is subject, of course, to it being socially
distinct and its members sharing an immutable characteristic. The
exercise must not be undertaken devoid of the cross-referencing to
social distinction, as the applicant’s society can change the width of
the group.143
4. THE EVOLUTIONARY IMPACT–SURVIVAL OF ONLY THE FITTEST
PSGS?
According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “the Board’s . . . interpretation of the Social Group Guidelines
may result in refugees being erroneously denied international protection . . . in violation of the United States’ fundamental obligations under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol . . . .”144 It
must be acknowledged though that the protected characteristics
approach has never been the sole approach to determining the PSG
issue and other state parties have and do apply similar standards
to those of social distinction and particularity when assessing PSG
claims. The effect of the Board’s tripartite test may therefore not be
as great as the concerns that have been expressed by the UNHCR
and others.
4.1. Social Distinction v. Social Perception
If social distinction, as articulated in the 2014 tripartite test, is
synonymous with the “social perception” approach of other countries,145 it may have little meaningful effect upon those claiming
143 See id. at 217 (indicating that “[t]o have the ‘social distinction’ necessary to
establish a particular social group, there must be evidence showing that society in
general perceives, considers, or recognizes persons sharing the particular characteristic to be a group”).
144 UNHCR Henriquez-Rivas, supra note 78, at 7.
145 Australia applies the social perception approach as the exclusive criterion
for establishing a PSG. See S v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs
(2004) 217 CLR 387, 409–10 (Austl.). The United Kingdom applies social perception as an alternative approach to the protected characteristics approach in establishing a PSG. See K v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t and Fornah v. Sec’y of
State for the Home Dep’t, [2007] 1 A.C. 412, 419 (U.K). The UNHCR endorses the
use of social perception as adopted in Australia and the United Kingdom but as
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protection under the PSG ground. This is principled upon the belief that all groups that fulfill the protected characteristics test are
socially distinct. Alexander Aleinikoff, former United Nations
Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees, has asserted in his work,
Protected Characteristics and Social Perceptions: An Analysis of the
Meaning of ‘Membership of a Particular Social Group,’ that groups that
meet the Acosta protected characteristics analysis are inexorably
perceived by society to be a group; that as members of the group
are unable to hide the characteristic that defines their group or are
unwilling to forsake their characteristic because of its fundamental
nature they fail to avoid persecutory treatment and consequently
are perceived to be groups within their society.146 Consequently,
any social group established under the protected characteristics
approach necessarily meets the social perception approach.147 As
the UNHCR explains, the protected characteristics approach can be
“understood to identify a set of groups that constitute the core of
the social perception analysis.”148
Given that the protected characteristics approach forms only
the core of the social perception approach, the necessary implication is that the latter is in fact a wider test.149 If applied as the sole
test for determining a PSG, it permits the recognition of more PSGs
than the protected characteristics approach.150 There are many

an alternative to the fundamental characteristics approach. See UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 58, at 3–4.
146
See Aleinikoff, supra note 6, at 297 (providing an example of this by describing that persons are likely to preserve deeply held religious and political
convictions even if they face harm in doing so because they may view such convictions as core to their identities).
147
See id. at 297–98 (providing a detailed discussion on social perception
analysis). This also appears to be the understanding of the UNHCR. See also
UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 58, ¶¶ 9, 11 (outlining guidelines on social group
status).
148 See id. ¶ 11 (“[A] particular social group is a group of persons who share a
common characteristic other than their risk of being persecuted, or who are perceived as a group by society. The characteristic will often be one which is innate,
unchangeable, or which is otherwise fundamental to identity, conscience or the
exercise of one’s human rights.”).
149
See Aleinikoff, supra note 6, at 272 (providing examples of overlap and
disparity between the tests). See also FOSTER, supra note 6, at 13, 74–75 (discussing
changes in PSG approach beginning in 1977 and stating social perception is “likely
to accommodate a wider range of groups than is capable of being encompassed
within the protected characteristics approach”).
150
See Aleinikoff, supra note 6, at 272 (outlining an example case). See also
Refugee Appeal No. 1312/93, at 60 (N.Z.) (“The difficulty with the ‘objective ob-
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groups that society perceives to exist that share a characteristic of
distinction and thereby meet the social perception test but fail to
meet the protected characteristics requirement; the characteristic of
distinction is so fundamental that they should not be required to
forsake it.151 If this is indeed the case, social perception as an added criterion should have little meaningful effect upon the groups
that will be recognized as PSGs.
By way of illustration, Aleinikoff refers to the United Kingdom
decision of Montoya,152 in which the asylum applicant alleged persecution by a Marxist Opposition group—the EPL—because of his
PSG: “the status of being an owner of land that is worked for profit.”153 The EPL had demanded money from Montoya and threatened to kill him if he refused to pay. His uncle had been killed under similar circumstances. Whilst the UK Immigration Appeal
Tribunal recognized that “the status of being an owner of land that
is worked for profit is an ostensible and significant social identifier
with historical overtones” in Colombia,154 ultimately “landownership” could not be recognized as it was not a fundamental characteristic that the applicant could not change nor should not be re-

server’ approach [i.e. social perception approach] is that it enlarges the social
group category to an almost meaningless degree. That is, by making societal attitudes determinative of the existence of the social group, virtually any group of
persons in a society perceived as a group could be said to be a particular social
group.”); FOSTER, supra note 6, at 14 (“In case there is any ambiguity in this definition, the Guidelines make clear that where a group is not based on a characteristic
deemed to be either unalterable or fundamental, further analysis should be undertaken to determine whether the group is nonetheless perceived as a cognizable
group in that society.”); James Hathaway & Michelle Foster, Membership of a Particular Social Group, 15 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 477, 484 (2003) (“the test is overly broad,
and need not affect any meaningful delimitation of the beneficiary class.”).
151 See A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, (1997) 190 CLR 225,
236 (Austl.) (“I see no ground for holding that a characteristic must be ‘innate or
unchangeable’ before it can distinguish a social group. If a characteristic distinguishes a social group from society at large and attracts persecution to the members of the group that is so distinguished, I see no reason why a well-founded fear
of that persecution might not support an application for refugee status”). See also
Aleinikoff, supra note 6 at 272, 295, 297–98 (describing that while a protected characteristics approach would likely encompass all those covered by a social perception analysis, the reverse may not be true).
152
See Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t v. Montoya, Appeal No.
CC/15806/2000, 13–15 (27 Apr. 2001) (IAT) (Eng.). The case was subsequently
upheld on appeal to the U.K. Court of Appeals. Montoya v. Sec’y of State for the
Home Dep’t, [2002] I.N.L.R. 399 (U.K.).
153 Aleinikoff, supra note 6, at 295.
154 Id.
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quired to change.155 In comparison, an application of the social
perception approach would have qualified the PSG for protection
given that Colombian society perceived landowners to be a social
group.156
The concern of adopting the social distinction test would therefore appear to be misplaced as those groups that would always
have met the protected characteristics approach would necessarily
meet the social distinction approach. This supposition would be
correct if the BIA’s social distinction analysis is indeed synonymous with the social perception approach endorsed by the
UNHCR and as applied by countries such as Australia and, more
recently, the United Kingdom. However, this is highly questionable. While there is commonality between the two approaches, they
are not equivalent.
Social distinction as a construct may well yield a narrower
band of protected groups than the social perception approach because, simply put, its scope is more limited. For a PSG to satisfy
the social distinction approach requires that the relevant society
“perceives, considers, or recognizes persons sharing the particular
characteristic to be a group.”157 In comparison, the social perception test does “not [require] that the group must be recognised or
perceived within the society, but rather that the group must be distinguished from the rest of the society.”158 One way of establishing
that the group is distinguished from the rest of the society “is by
examining whether the society in question perceives there to be
such a group.”159 This is where the two tests correspond. Where
they diverge is that social perception, unlike social distinction, recId.
Although the IAT determined that “prosperous landowners in Columbia”
were perceived as a group by Columbian Society, asylum was ultimately refused
as UK law at that time required assessment of a PSG based solely upon the Acosta
protected characteristics approach. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t v. Montoya,
Appeal No. CC/15806/2000 12 (27 Apr. 2001) (IAT) (Eng.) (interpreting Islam v.
Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t and Regina v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal and
Another Ex Parte Shah [1999] 2 A.C. 629 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.)) and determining that the group’s characteristic “must be one that is immutable or, put
summarily, is beyond the power of the individual to change except at the cost of
renunciation of fundamental human rights.”). The IAT also referred with approval to Acosta in providing this guidance.
157 In re W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 217 (BIA 2014).
158
S v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, (2004) 217 CLR
387, 398 (Austl.).
159 Id. at 397–98.
155
156
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ognizes that a group can be cognizable as a result of cultural, social, religious, and legal factors that exist in the given society even
if it is the case that the PSG is not perceived by the society in question to exist.160 The Australian High Court elucidated when a
group will be “distinguished” from society rather than “perceived”
by reference to the case of Khawar161 and the claimed PSG of “Married Pakistani Women.”162 The Court was of the opinion that it
could not be proven that “Married Pakistani Women” were consciously perceived to be a particular social group by Pakistani Society.163 Despite this, the Court concluded that the PSG nevertheless
existed: “the operation of cultural, social, religious and legal factors, rather than any perceptions held by the community, . . . determin[ed] that married Pakistani women were a group that was
distinguished or set apart from the rest of the community.” 164 The
social perception analysis, therefore, permits the establishment of a
PSG either by virtue of societal perceptions or by reference to cultural, social, religious, or legal factors, which have differentiated
the group, and thereby made it a cognizable group within the society in question. This approach recognizes that PSGs can exist even
where societies refuse to acknowledge their existence165 or where
160
Id. at 399, 400, 404, 413. See also id. at 408 (according to McHugh J: “To
qualify as ‘a particular social group,’ the group must be a cognisable group within
the relevant society, but it is not necessary that it be recognized as a group that is
set apart from the rest of that society.”).
161 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Khawar, (2002) 210
CLR 1 (Austl.).
162 S, 217 CLR at 398.
163 Id.
164
Id. Such an approach overcomes the need to artificially create a group
which for example the United States has struggled with in its recognition of women within given societies constituting a PSG. See, e.g., HongYing Gao v. Gonzales,
440 F.3d 62, 70 (2d Cir. 2006) (“women who have been sold into marriage (whether or not that marriage has yet taken place) and who live in a part of China where
forced marriages are considered valid and enforceable”); Rreshpja v. Gonzales,
420 F.3d 551, 555 (6th Cir. 2005) (rejecting “young (or those who appear to be
young), attractive Albanian women who are forced into prostitution” as a PSG); In
re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 358 (BIA 1996) (“young women of the TchamaKunsuntu Tribe who have not had FGM, as practiced by that tribe, who oppose
the practice”). Gao was accepted as to the PSG but vacated on other grounds.
Keisler v. Gao, 552 U.S. 801, 801 (2007).
165
See S v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, (2004) 217
CLR 387, 410 (Austl.) (referring to the consolidated cases of Appellant S395/2002
v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs and Appellant S396/2002 v
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, (2003) 216 CLR 473 (Austl.) in
which the evidence was that Bangladeshi society denied the existence of homo-
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societies do not consciously regard the group as one within their
society,166 but nevertheless the cultural, social, religious, or legal
factors have in reality led to a group of persons being set apart
from the rest of society.
It cannot, therefore, be asserted that every group that meets the
protected characteristics test will necessarily satisfy the BIA’s social
distinction test. It would appear that immigration advocates are
correct to be concerned about the impact that the new test of social
distinction will have upon the ability of their clients to be granted
asylum based upon their PSG. The upside is, as the Australian
High Court has asserted, that it will only be in the rare case that a
particular social group is distinguished by society and not at the
same time perceived to exist.167
More problematic are the practical hurdles that an applicant
will now face. Proving the perception of a society half a world
away is likely to present a significant evidentiary challenge for
most asylum seekers. An applicant is now required to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that either their country or the
smaller section of the society from which they fled perceives the
existence of the claimed social group.168 Objective evidence, including “country conditions reports, expert witness testimony, and
press accounts of discriminatory laws and policies, historical animosities, and the like,”169 the BIA has stated, will provide the necessary evidence. It is this type of evidence that is also commonly
used to support the social perception approach, but this has not
proven to be without difficulties.170
sexuals, but nevertheless “police, hustlers and others in that society singled homosexuals out for . . . persecution . . . . [It was determined that] [o]bjectively, homosexuals in Bangladeshi society comprise ‘a particular social group,’ whether or
not that society recognizes them as such.”).
166 See S, 217 CLR at 410–11 (“The Taliban practised ad hoc, random, forcible
recruitment of young men, where the only apparent criterion for recruitment was
that the young men be able-bodied.”).
167 See id. at 410 (“No doubt such cases are likely to be rare.”).
168
See In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 244 (BIA 2014) (“when an applicant makes a claim of persecution based on political opinion or religion, he or she
is required to provide evidence that the claimed political or religious group exists
and is recognized as such in the relevant society”).
169 Id.
170 See S, 217 CLR at 400 (stating that adjudicators can “draw conclusions as
to whether the group is cognizable within the community from ‘country information’ gathered by international bodies and nations other than the applicant’s
nation of origin”).
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The challenge is that these types of reports are unlikely to reference with specificity the existence or recognition of many social
groups. It is implausible that country condition reports would
state, for example, that Guatemalan society perceives “married
women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship”171
to be a particular social group. In the wake of In re W-G-R-172 this
challenge is now a stark reality. An applicant’s failure to provide
sufficient proof of social distinctiveness is now almost a routine
procedure for rejection of PSG claims.173
Applicants and their attorneys need to think outside the box
and look to sources that are not as routinely utilized as country
condition reports, such as sociological, anthropological, and historical literature, press reports, and testimonial evidence of academics
and others who are experts on the particular country in question as
well as the testimonial evidence of the applicant’s fellow country
men and women. Additional support may be found arguably
through an examination of cases of other State Parties to the Refugee Convention, particularly those that have adopted the social
perception approach, at least to assist applicants in unearthing the
necessary documentary evidence to support their case. An inherent danger that is associated with the use of this type of evidence is
that it may be alien to many asylum adjudicators who typically
place great weight upon State Department Country Condition Reports in assessing asylum claims. The credence that adjudicators
may be prepared to give to these additional types of evidence is as
yet unknown.

In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 389 (BIA 2014).
26 I. & N. Dec. 208 (BIA 2014).
173 See, e.g., Vega-Ayala v. Lynch, 833 F.3d 34, 39 (1st Cir. 2016) (“There was
no evidence that Salvadoran society regards her proposed group as distinct.”);
Ramirez-Munoz v. Lynch, 816 F.3d 1226, 1229 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[W]e hold that the
proposed group of ‘imputed wealthy Americans’ is not a discrete class of persons
recognized by society as a particular social group.”); Cano v. Lynch, 809 F.3d 1056,
1059 (8th Cir. 2016) (“[T]his evidence alone is insufficient to support a conclusion
that Mexican child laborers who have escaped their captors are ‘perceived as a cohesive group by society.’”); Castro-Escobar v. Lynch, 639 Fed. Appx. 22, 25 (2d
Cir. 2016) (upholding that such a group “is too loosely defined to meet the requirement of particularity, inasmuch as the group would likely encompass a large
portion of the Guatemalan society, and does not have the requisite social visibility”); Rodas-Orellana v. Holder 780 F.3d 982, 992 (10th Cir. 2015) (“Although MS13 threatened and assaulted him for resisting recruitment, Mr. Rodas-Orellana has
failed to establish that his membership in a particular social group was a central
reason for MS-13’s actions.”).
171
172
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As challenging as the evidentiary burden placed upon applicants is the ability of asylum adjudicators to objectively assess
whether a foreign society half a world away recognizes or perceives that a particular group of persons is socially distinct. Objectively analyzing the evidence to determine the existence of a PSG
has proven to be problematic in those countries that have for decades applied the social perception approach, and “[i]nconsistency
in decision-making . . . suggest[s] that there is considerable subjectivity involved in assessing . . . [the social perception] approach to
defining a PSG.”174 Adjudicators presented with the same claimed
grouping in the same country and presented with very similar evidence have come to opposing decisions as to the society’s perception of the claimed PSG.175 “[T]he subjectivity inherent in relying
on country information to determine whether a group is “objectively identifiable” or “cognisable” within a given society . . . [is] very
clear.”176 The Australian Federal Court has expressed concern with
the difficulties encountered in accurately identifying the “particular social group” based upon the social perception approach and
the consequential erroneous decisions that have resulted.177 These
errors, the Court asserts, arise from not only the actions of the adjudicators in evaluating the evidence but also from the point of
view of the applicant in knowing what and how to establish the
claimed PSG.178
The United States’ own jurisprudence is indicative of the
dangers and difficulties associated with the subjective assessment
of objective evidence. As previously discussed, the Board’s former
social visibility test had led to some circuits recognizing, and others
rejecting, the existence of PSGs in respect to similarly situated
claims. Arguably the clarity brought by the Board’s 2014 decisions
should overcome these difficulties. However, this is yet to be

FOSTER, supra note 6, at 37, n. 216.
See id. (referring, for example, to decisions of the Australian Refugee Review Tribunal in 2009 that accepted without question that “high profile failed asylum seekers” were a PSG in Rwanda and later that same year rejected the existence of the group on almost identical facts).
176 Id.
177
MZXDQ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, [2006]
FCA 1632, ¶ 23 (Fed. Ct. of Austrl.). See also FOSTER, supra note 6, at 38 (referring
to the same case).
178 MZXDQ, [2006] FCA. at ¶ 23.
174
175
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proven, and in fact, several post In re W-G-R-179 decisions have
been remanded due to the Board’s failure to adhere to its new
precedent and objectively assess the social distinction requirement.
The Ninth Circuit remanded the case of Pirir Boc v. Holder to the
BIA to consider the evidence submitted by the applicant in support
of the existence of the group within Guatemalan society.180 The
Board’s conclusion that the claimed PSG, “persons taking concrete
steps to oppose gang membership and gang authority,”181 lacked
social distinction and particularity was based upon their prior conclusions in similar cases and without any evaluation of the evidence the applicant had submitted to support that in Guatemalan
society this group is distinct.182 The Board in In re W-G-R- had concluded that while the ultimate determination that a PSG did or did
not exist in a given case was a question of law, “the analysis of a
particular social group claim is based on the evidence presented
and is often a fact-specific inquiry.”183 Three days after rendering
the decision in In re W-G-R- the Board had failed to carry out this
inquiry.184
Oliva v. Lynch185 similarly demonstrates a failure by the BIA to
objectively assess the evidence. The BIA concluded that Oliva had
failed to provide any evidence other than one example from his

26 I. & N. Dec. 208 (BIA 2014).
Pirir-Boc v. Holder, 750 F.3d 1077, 1084 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that the
Board failed to consider State “Department Country Reports on Guatemala, a
Congressional Research Service Report for Congress on Gangs in Central America
. . . and background documents including news articles and Amnesty International Reports on Guatemala” and assess how Guatemalan society viewed the claimed
group).
181 Id. at 1080.
182 Id. at 1084. The immigration judge who had assessed the evidence had, in
comparison, concluded that Guatemalan society understood that there were those
who were making a concerted effort to combat gang activity and Pirir-Boc,
through his actions, would be perceived as associated with this group.
183 26 I. & N. Dec. at 209–10.
184 See also Gonzalez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 820 F.3d 399, 401, 405 (11th Cir. 2016)
(recently upholding the BIA’s decision that “former members of the Mara–18 gang
from Honduras” were not a PSG based upon its prior precedential decisions in In
re W-G-R- and In re E-A-G-). The Eleventh Circuit gave deference to the BIA’s decision because it was based upon two prior BIA precedential decisions. Id. at 405.
Given that the evidence of the existence of a group may well change over time,
become more distinct, or that more viable evidence may come to light, finding
that a claimed PSG does not exist based upon a prior decision is a dangerous
precedent to follow.
185 Oliva v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 53, 61 (4th Cir. 2015).
179
180
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own testimony that former gang members were socially distinct.186
This conclusion was reached without reference to reports submitted by the applicant which “evidence[d] . . . government- and
community-driven programs to help former gang members rehabilitate themselves and an affidavit from a community organizer
who stated that former gang members who leave the gang for religious reasons become seriously and visibly involved in churches.”187
Most recently the Second Circuit remanded a decision of the
Board; this time the error occurred when the Board failed to evaluate the PSG as articulated by the applicant.188 The applicant
claimed that he faced persecution because of his membership in the
“Association of Cattlemen and Farmers of Chanmagua.”189 The
Board diluted the potential distinctiveness of the claimed PSG by
generalizing it and asserting the applicant did not “sufficiently
demonstrate that the business people associated with farmers and
ranchers, who also provide support for the poor, are perceived,
considered, or recognized by Guatemalan society to be a distinct
social group.”190
Despite these erroneous attempts, the BIA has demonstrated
that objective analysis of the social distinction requirement is possible in In re A-R-C-G-, involving a claim based upon the PSG of
“married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship.”191 The Board was willing to rely upon a Canadian
Broadcasting Corporation Report that demonstrated a culture of
“machismo and family violence” in Guatemala and Country Condition Reports that evidenced sexual offenses against women, including spousal rape, were a serious problem and that the laws in
place to prosecute domestic violence were not enforced.192 From
Id.
“[T]he BIA failed to address any of the other evidence that Oliva put
forth, including evidence of government-and community-driven programs to help
former gang members rehabilitate themselves and an affidavit from a community
organizer who stated that former gang members who leave the gang for religious
reasons become seriously and visibly involved in churches.” Id.
188 Morales–Espania v. Lynch, 651 Fed. Appx. 40, 44 (2d Cir. 2016).
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 389 (BIA 2014). This decision was handed down by
the Board after its decision in Oliva v. Lynch and 15 months before the Fourth Circuit’s decision.
192 Id. at 394.
186
187
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this evidence, the Board was prepared to conclude that Guatemalan society “makes meaningful distinctions based on the common
immutable characteristics of being a married woman in a domestic
relationship that she cannot leave.”193 There was no requirement
that the evidence submitted by the asylum applicant expressly
state that married women who cannot leave their domestic relationship was a recognized social group. Rather, the BIA was prepared to evaluate the evidence submitted and draw the logical inference that Guatemalan society recognized “married women in a
domestic relationship that they cannot leave” as a distinct social
group.
In re A-R-C-G- does indeed demonstrate the ability and the
willingness of the BIA to fulfill its obligation of objective decision
making.194 In comparison, the Board’s errors in Pirir-Boc,195 Oliva,196 and Morales–Espani197 almost demonstrate an ignorance of this
obligation; the question is why the paradox?
One answer is that the Board may be experiencing the same issues associated with social distinctiveness that other countries
have—difficulties associated with the limited evidence that applicants submit, how to best evaluate this evidence, and what logical
inferences can be drawn concerning whether a foreign culture perceives a claimed PSG to exist. The evidence in In re A-R-C-G- may
simply have been more well developed and easier to understand
and the cultural norms more explicit, allowing objective decision
making to more readily transpire.
Alternatively, it could be argued that the Board’s methodology
in the three remanded cases was contrived for the specific purpose
of non-recognition of the applicants’ claimed PSGs. Each of these
cases involved applicants who were either former gang members
or had opposed gang activities. Applicants that pose a danger in
one way or another to U.S. society; and consequently their undesirability primed the Board to undertake subjective rather than objective decision making. In comparison In re A-R-C-G- did not pose
such a threat, victims of domestic violence now being viewed by

193
194
195
196
197

Id.
See generally In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (BIA 2014).
750 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2014).
807 F.3d 53 (4th Cir. 2015).
651 Fed. Appx. 40 (2d Cir. 2016).
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the U.S. as worthy of a grant of asylum.198
At this point it is still conjecture as to which of the two proffered explanations is correct. Only with further development of social distinction jurisprudence will the true rationale become apparent. What is known at this point though is that the potential does
exist to use the social distinctiveness requirement to surreptitiously
screen out groups that are considered unpalatable.
4.2. Particularity v. Cognizability
According to the UNHCR, particularity has the effect of excluding social groups that would otherwise qualify for protection and
is therefore inconsistent with the tenor of the Refugee Convention
and Protocol.199 The United States is not the only country, however, to measure the particularity of an asserted group. Other parties
to the Convention, including Australia, the United Kingdom, and
New Zealand, require the claimed social group meet the requirement of “particularity,” or as these countries term it, “cognizability.”200
Like particularity, cognizability requires that the claimed PSG
is capable of recognition within the society in question and not
simply a sweeping demographic:
The group must in fact be . . . a particular social group. It is
not enough that its members form a demographic division
of the relevant society, such as people aged thirty-three or
those earning above or below a certain amount per annum.

198 It has been ventured that post-2004 there had been a growing consensus
among immigration judges to recognize PSGs based upon domestic violence, provided the applicant victim was able to demonstrate that domestic violence was
endemic in their country, there was lack of protection by their own state and they
were unable to leave the relationship. Matter of A-R-C-G, Board of Immigration
Appeals Holds That Guatemalan Woman Fleeing Domestic Violence Meets Threshold
Asylum Requirement, Recent Adjudication: 26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (BIA 2014), 128
HARV. L. REV. 2090, 2094 (2015).
199 UNHCR Rivera-Barrientos, supra note 94.
200 K v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t and Fornah v. Sec’y of State for the
Home Dep’t, [2007] 1 A.C. 412, 431–32 (U.K); A v Minister for Immigration and
Ethnic Affairs, (1997) 190 CLR 225, 305 (Austl.); Refugee Appeal No. 1312/93, at
56 (N.Z.).
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. . . [T]he words ‘‘particular’’ and ‘‘social’’ indicate that the
term ‘‘a particular social group’’ ‘‘is not apt to encompass
every broadly defined segment of those sharing a particular
country of nationality.’’ A demographic division of persons
may constitute a group because, for statistical or recording
purposes, those persons may be properly classified or considered together. Nevertheless, such a group of persons is
not necessarily ‘‘a particular social group’’ within the meaning of Art 1A(2) of the Convention.201
This explanation of cognizability by the Australian High Court
is arguably equivalent to particularity and the Board’s explanation
that to meet the particularity requirement the PSG “must not be
amorphous, overbroad, diffuse, or subjective”202 and that “major
segments of the population will rarely, if ever, constitute a distinct
social group.”203 Upon closer examination, the two approaches are
not synonymous, although there is definite commonality.
Cognizability requires that the group have a characteristic
which sets it apart from the rest of society. This is what makes the
group particular.204 This is where the two approaches overlap: the
BIA has asserted that in applying the test of particularity “it may
be necessary to take into account the social and cultural context of
the alien’s country of citizenship or nationality” to determine
whether it is a discrete group recognizable within that society.205
Where the two approaches vary is that the size of the group is

201
S v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, (2004) 217 CLR
387, 409 (Austl.). See also A, 190 CLR at 241 (echoing a similar definition of “particular”).
202 In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 239 (BIA 2014).
203
See id. at 239 (citing with approval Ochoa v. Gonzales, 406 F.3d 1166,
1170–71 (9th Cir. 2005)).
204 See A, 190 CLR at 241 (“The word ‘particular’ in the definition merely indicates that there must be an identifiable social group such that a group can be
pointed to as a particular social group. A particular social group, therefore, is a
collection of persons who share a certain characteristic or element which unites
them and enables them to be set apart from society at large. That is to say, not only must such persons exhibit some common element; the element must unite
them, making those who share it a cognisable group within their society.”). See also K
v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t and Fornah v. Secretary of State for the Home
Department, [2007] 1 A.C. 412, 419 (U.K) (noting similar comments made by the
House of Lords).
205 In re W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 214 (BIA 2004).
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an important indicator of particularity but not cognizability. The
Board and several of the Federal Circuit Courts have rejected PSGs
because of numerosity concerns, asserting that the PSG was too
amorphous.206 While these cases occurred prior to clarification of
the tripartite test, the Board’s 2014 elucidation of particularity
without a doubt endorsed the relevancy of size. This is demonstrated by the rationalization that particularity is necessary to put
outer limits207 on the PSG definition and the Board’s citation with
approval to the Ninth Circuit’s dicta that “major segments of the
population will rarely, if ever, constitute a distinct social group.”208
Particularity is satisfied, therefore, by providing a sufficiently
discrete label for the claimed PSG, a descriptor that is not considered “amorphous, overbroad, diffuse, or subjective.”209 While applicants and their counsel can, and do, craft narrowly articulated
descriptors for their PSG, the downside is the difficulty in being
able to prove that the group is socially distinct given that it has
been artificially contrived for the purposes of obviating numerosity
concerns. It places the applicant in a Catch 22 situation: if the applicant articulates the group as it is perceived in their society, it is
likely to be regarded as too large; but if the PSG is constructed narrowly, then it is unlikely the applicant will be able to prove that the
PSG is recognized by their society.210
In comparison, size is not a relevant consideration in the application of cognizability.211 A sweeping demographic is not the same
206 See Portillo v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 435 Fed. App'x 844, 847 (11th Cir. 2011)
(arguing that the PSG “serve[s] as a catch-all for every former military member
who did not fall within one of the five protected groups, creating numerosity concerns”); In re S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 584 (BIA 2008) (concerning the Board’s
noting that “the size of the proposed group may be an important factor in determining whether the group can be . . . recognized . . . .”); In re A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24
I. & N. Dec. 69, 76 (BIA 2007) (“Because the concept of wealth is so indeterminate,
the proposed group could vary from as little as 1 percent to as much as 20 percent
of the population, or more”). See also Malonga v. Mulasey, 546 F. 3d 546, 553 (8th
Cir. 2008) (discussing when a social group is too broad to qualify for asylum).
207 W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 214.
208 M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 239 (citing with approval Ochoa v. Gonzales,
406 F.3d at 1166, 1170–71).
209 M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 239.
210
Nicholas Bednar, Social Group Semantics: The Evidentiary Requirements of
“Particularity” and “Social Distinction” in Pro Se Asylum Adjudications, 100 MINN. L.
REV. 355, 383 (2015).
211 See Spain Tribunal Supremo of Spain in STS 6862/2011, at 7 (Oct. 24, 2011)
(Adrienne Anderson trans., cited in FOSTER, supra note 6) (“In fact, the group size
is not an important criterion”); Montoya v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t,
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as a large social group. While the group in question may appear at
first glance to be a demographic because it possesses characteristics
that apply to populations generally, such as being male, female,
married, unmarried, youth, adult, urban, or landowner, the number of persons within a population that share these attributes is not
what determines if the group is or is not a “particular” social
group. What determines if the group is cognizable is whether persons who share the common characteristic or characteristics are set
apart from the society in general.212 If they are, then they are part
of a “particular social group” no matter the size of the group or
how generally the words describing the group may appear on their
face. This is recognized by countries that apply either the protected characteristics approach or the social perception approach.213

[2002] I.N.L.R. 399, 409 (U.K.) (“there is nothing in principle to prevent the size of
the PSG being large (e.g. women), but if the claim relies on some refinement or
sub–category of a larger group, care must be taken over whether the resultant
group is still definable independently of their persecution”); Refugee Appeal No.
71427/99, [2000] NZAR 545, ¶ 109 (N.Z) (“[t]he size of the group cannot be a limiting factor given the breadth of application of the other four Convention categories.”); A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, (1997) 190 CLR 225, 241
(Austl.) (per. Dawson J: “I can see no reason to confine a particular social group
to small groups or large ones; a family or a group of millions may each be a particular social group”). See also Chairperson Guidelines 4: Women Refugee Claimants
Fearing Gender-Related Persecution, IMMIGR. & REFUGEE BOARD OF CAN. (Nov. 13,
1996) http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/Eng/BoaCom/references/pol/GuiDir/Pages/
GuideDir04.aspx#AIII [https://perma.cc/4R3K-ZDE6] (“The fact that the particular social group consists of large numbers of the female population in the country
concerned is irrelevant -- race, religion, nationality and political opinion are also
characteristics that are shared by large numbers of people.”). See K v. Sec’y of
State for the Home Dep’t and Fornah v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2007] 1
A.C. 412, 464 (U.K.) (noting that the use of size as a determining factor has “no basis in fact or reason”); IMMIGRATION APPELLATE AUTHORITY, ASYLUM GENDER
GUIDELINES ¶ 3.45 (2000) (“The fact that the particular social group consists of
large number of the female population in the country concerned is irrelevant - race,
religion, nationality and political opinion are also characteristics that are shared
by large numbers of people.”). Similar comments have been made by the UNHCR:
“The size of the purported social group is not a relevant criterion in determining
whether a particular social group exists within the meaning of Article 1A(2).”
UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 58, at 5.
212
Islam v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t and Regina v. Immigration
Appeal Tribunal and Another Ex Parte Shah, [1999] 2 A.C. 629, 657, 660 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.); A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, (1997) 190
CLR 225, 241 (Austl.); Refugee Appeal No. 1312/93, at 30, 33–34, 62 (N.Z).
213 See Refugee Appeal No. 71427/99, [2000] NZAR 545, ¶ 109 (N.Z) (recognizing that while the PSG of “Women in Iran” may seem large, “[t]he size of the
group cannot be a limiting factor given the breadth of application of the other four
Convention categories.”). See also Fornah, [2007] 1 A.C. at 464 (accepting that ei-
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Consequently, such groups as “Women in Iran,”214 “Homosexual
men in Bangladesh,”215 and “Children from Afghanistan [without
parents],”216 have been recognized as particular social groups.
These PSGs would, on their face, appear to be sweeping demographics and groups that are amorphous, overbroad, and too
diffuse according to the Board of Immigration Appeals, but as the
English Court of Appeal observed, this fails to take into account
“that a ‘particular social group’ cannot be identified in the abstract.
It is necessary to identify the society of which it forms part in order
to identify whether” the PSG is set apart from society in general.217
If it is set apart from society, then it is a “particular social group.”
Cognizability in these countries is, therefore, assessed as an implicit component of the social perception approach or of the fundamental characteristics approach and not a separate criterion that
applicants must prove and without doubt, size is not a relevant indicator.
While some may argue that the recent decision of In re A-R-CG-218 signals a willingness of the Board to step away from the size
concern of earlier decisions, it is unlikely that this will be the
case.219 If size was not an issue, then the Board would have been
ther uninitiated indigenous females in Sierra Leone or women in Sierra Leone
were acceptable as particular social groups and citing with approval to the
UNHCR guidelines that the size of the group is irrelevant). See Montoya, [2002]
I.N.L.R. at 409 (“there is nothing in principle to prevent the size of the PSG being
large.”); IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE BOARD OF CANADA, MEMBERSHIP OF A
PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP AS A BASIS FOR A WELL-FOUNDED FEAR OF PERSECUTION FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS ¶ 3 (1991), http://www.refworld.org/docid/
3ae6b32510.html [https://perma.cc/9KP8-U43T] (noting that “[g]roup size is irrelevant”).
214 Refugee Appeal No. 71427/99, [2000] NZAR ¶ 9 (N.Z.).
215
Appellant S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs and Appellant S396/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, (2003) 216 CLR 473, ¶ 81 (Austl.).
216 LQ (Age: Immutable Characteristic) Afghanistan [2008] U.K.A.I.T. 00005,
¶ 6 [U.K.]. But see HK (Afghanistan) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2012]
E.W.C.A. Civ. 315, ¶¶ 7–9 (U.K.) (strongly suggesting that the group was more
limited than all children in Afghanistan and should be limited to those who had
no parents to provide protection).
217
Fornah v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2005] 1 W.L.R. Imm. 3773,
3778 (U.K. Ct. of App.).
218 26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (BIA 2014).
219
Decisions post A-R-C-G- are indicative that “particularity” will continue
to act as a control on large social groups. See, e.g., Castro-Escobar v. Lynch, 639
Fed. Appx. 22, 26 (2d Cir. 2016) (supporting the Board’s decision rejecting “Castro–Escobar's putative particular social group made up of Guatemalans opposed
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prepared to determine, as submitted by the American Immigration
Lawyers Association, the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, and the Center for Gender & Refugee Studies, “that gender alone should be enough to constitute a particular social group
in this matter.”220 The issue was sidestepped as unnecessary given
that the proffered PSG of “married women in Guatemala who are
unable to leave their relationship” had been recognized.221 If the
Board had accepted that gender can constitute a particular social
group, it would have run the inherent danger of impliedly supporting the recognition of other generally labeled groups such as
“homeless youth within Country X” or “young women living in
gang territory,”222 groups that the Board has clearly sought to exclude from Convention protection.
Ultimately, the Board’s construct of particularity is like social
distinction, a fertile area for subjective decision-making. Stating
that the group is too amorphous or overbroad to constitute a particular social group arms decision-makers with the latitude to discount groups under the guise of demographics and size. It permits
adjudicators to manipulate the outcome of a PSG claim and limit
asylum to those groups considered to be desirable and not apt to
arrive at the border in great numbers.

to gangs and gang violence . . . [because] such a group ‘is too loosely defined to
meet the requirement of particularity, inasmuch as the group would likely encompass a large portion of the Guatemalan society.’”); Aguilon–Lopez v. Lynch,
No. 15-2570, 2016 WL 7210071, 3 (1st Cir. Dec. 12, 2016) (confirming that the
claimed PSG, “residents of Guatemala who have been threatened with gang violence and recruitment to a gang, and have refused,” lacked particularity; it was
“comprised of people from an impermissibly broad variety of ages and backgrounds,” lacked specificity as to the “type of conduct that may be considered 'recruit[ment]' and the degree to which a person must display 'resist[ance],’” and
lacked “accurate separation of members from nonmembers”); Lopez–Diaz v.
Lynch, No. 15-2722, 2016 WL 5799264, 2 (2d Cir. Oct. 4, 2016) (agreeing that “the
boundaries of Lopez–Diaz's proposed group are overbroad and narrowed only by
subjectively defined factors that do not “provide a clear benchmark for determining who falls within the group,” i.e., what constitutes abuse by family members or
vulnerability to abuse).
220 A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 395, n. 16.
221 Id.
222 This is subject to the applicant being able to prove through the provision
of objective evidence establishing that the society in question views the group as
distinct.
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5. CONCLUSION
The Board of Immigration Appeals’ new PSG test is here to
stay, at least for the foreseeable future. For 10 years, the addition
of the social visibility/social distinction and particularity requirements has lauded criticism and challenge from the UNHCR, asylum advocates, applicants, academics, and certain sections of the
bench. Despite the turbulent evolution of the tripartite test, the
Board has stood steadfast in its resolve that to establish a PSG, an
applicant must prove that the group possesses an immutable or
fundamental characteristic, is socially distinct, and has discrete
boundaries. The clear purpose of the new test is to limit the potential types and size of groups that can find protection within the
United States. It is an attempt to close the borders to large and
seemingly undesirable sections of the world’s refugee population.
In doing so, the Board is, as the UNHCR has alleged, failing to uphold its obligations under the Refugee Convention and Protocol.
The turbulent road though is still to be travelled not only for
applicants and their counsel but also the Board. It is incumbent
upon advocates to use the tripartite test to their advantage—to
provide the objective evidence necessary to prove that their client’s
group not only has an immutable or fundamental characteristic but
also is recognized within their country of origin and that the group
is one that, because of such recognition, is not amorphous but has
boundaries which make it particular. A sound understanding of
the requirements of social distinction and particularity will enable
asylum advocates to provide the necessary objective evidence and
roadmap the existence of the PSG. Difficult as the task may be, in
most cases it will not be insurmountable.
The greatest danger posed to any PSG claim by the new tripartite test, arguably, is the ability of adjudicators to manipulate the
outcome through subjective decision-making. Any unfavorable
conclusion reached that is not substantiated by logical reasoning as
to why the objective evidence does not support the existence of the
claimed PSG must be challenged. Banal conclusions that the group
is too amorphous or that the applicant has provided little in the
way of evidence without more is a strong indication of subjective
decision-making. Both the Fourth and the Ninth Circuits have indicated that the Board will be held accountable and required to
provide sound reasons for the conclusions that they reach in respect to both social distinction and particularity, providing an ap-
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plicant has submitted objective evidence in support of their PSG.
It must be kept in mind that the continual challenge to the concept of social visibility resulted in its conversion into a requirement
of social distinction and a lowering therefore of the threshold for
establishing a PSG. Advocates need to continue to contest the
premise that particularity equates to size and that social distinction
is an additional requirement to establishing a PSG rather than an
alternative means. Continuing to highlight and draw upon the
evolution of these factors from the jurisprudence of other parties to
the Refugee Convention, particularly other common law countries,
can only serve to assist in this endeavor.
The Refugee Convention and Protocol are international human
rights instruments to which the United States has agreed to be
bound. An asylum adjudicator’s duty, therefore, extends not to only interpreting and applying the asylum laws of the United States
but upholding the international human rights obligations of the
United States. The result of a decision to recognize or not to recognize a PSG can be one of life or death, consequently it is prudent
that adjudicators bear in mind that in administering these laws,
“[a]djudication is not a conventional lawyer’s exercise of
applying a legal litmus test to ascertain facts; it is a global
appraisal of an individual’s past and prospective situation
in a particular cultural, social, political, and legal milieu,
judged by a test which, though it has legal and linguistic
limits, has a broad humanitarian purpose.”222

222
R v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Ex Parte Shah, [1997] Imm. A.R.
145, 153 (U.K. High Ct.).
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